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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts offered in appellee's brief requires 
response because it is encumbered by inaccurate and irrelevant 
details. 
The appellee's "facts" are inaccurate in the following places: 
1. Concerning Mr. Irizarry's relationship with his current 
wife, Patty Irizarry, Mr. Irizarrv began dating Patty in February 
or March 1984 . . . .x Appellee's brief at 9. This is a misstatement 
of what Mr. Irizarry testified to regarding his relationship with 
his current wife. Mr. Irizarry testified that he began dating his 
current wife seriously in February or March of 1984 and that he met 
his current wife in October 1984. R.593. Furthermore, by the time 
Mr. Irizarry began seriously dating his current wife, approximately 
four months after they had met in October 1984, they had made the 
decision to get married. R.593-594.2 This is a significant 
misstatement of the facts by appellee because the record clearly 
indicates that Mr. Irizarry's and his current wife's dating 
relationship began well before February or March of 1985 and in all 
likelihood began when he met her in October 1984, while he was 
supposedly making an effort to support his and Ms. Parker's unborn 
children. 
2. . . .Mr. Irizarrv began dating his current wife, Patty 
xThis date reference is most likely a mistake by appellee. 
The record indicates February or March 1985. (R.593). 
20n direct examination, Mr. Irizarry testified that he and his 
current wife did not talk about marriage until May of 1985. 
(R.577). However, on cross examination, Mr. Irizarry testified 
that he and his current wife talked about getting married about 
four months after they met which would coincide with the February 
or March 1985 date when they began seriously dating. (R.593). 
Irizarry..., more than one month after Ms. Parker refused his help 
for the second time and had made clear her desire that he stay out 
of her life and the lives of the twins by tellincr him that under no 
circumstances would she name the twins "Irizarry," and that she 
intended to give the children her last name. Appellee's brief at 
9. 
Appellants assume that this "fact" asserted by appellee refers 
to Mr. Irizarry's version of a conversation he and Ms. Parker had 
in January 1985. This is a factual misstatement because appellee 
has characterized rather than stated Mr. Irizarry's testimony and 
this characterization has created what is no longer "fact, " but 
argument. 
Mr. Irizarry did not testify that Ms. Parker made specific 
statements to him indicating that he was to stay out of the lives 
of the twins. Mr. Irizarry's testimony regarding that January 
telephone conversation focused on his relationship with Ms. Parker. 
In this regard, Mr. Irizarry testified that Ms. Parker stated she 
did not want to have anything to do with him anymore. R.572. Ms. 
Parker's testimony regarding the name on the birth certificate was 
that she seated to Mr. Irizarry that she was putting Parker as the 
last name on the birth certificate because she was the one doing 
all the work and she was not getting any support from Mr. Irizarry. 
R.453. 
3 . Concerning the communications between Mr. Irizarry and Ms. 
Parker between September 1984 and June 1985, Mr. Irizarry testified 
that on at least three occasions, in September 1984, in November 
2 
1984 and January 1985, Ms. Parker told him that she did not want 
his financial help and wanted nothing to do with him. Appellee's 
brief at 7-8. 
This is a misstatement of Mr. Irizarry's testimony. Mr. 
Irizarry did not testify that on these three occasions in September 
1984, November 1984 and January 1985 that Ms. Parker told him that 
she did not want his financial help and wanted nothing to do with 
him. 
(1) Regarding the September communication, Mr. Irizarry 
testified as follows: 
Q. What can you tell us about the conversation you had 
in September? 
A. She was very, very angry. I don't know if she took 
the money as charity or what, but she was clearly angry 
at me for sending money and she said not to send money 
again. She would finish her degree and do it on her own. 
That was pretty much -- she did actually receive the 
check and that was the reason for my call. R.566. 
There was no testimony indicating that Ms. Parker stated she did 
not want his financial help and wanted nothing to do with him.3 
As a matter of fact, notwithstanding the speculation of Mr. 
Irizarry concerning Ms. Parker's feelings toward the money he 
testified he sent in September, it is clear from his testimony that 
Ms. Parker did take the money. This is a contraindication that Ms. 
Parker did not want Mr. Irizarry's financial support. 
3Appellants submit that Mr. Irizarry's version of Ms. Parker's 
alleged statement "to not send money again" should not be construed 
as a statement of not wanting financial support since Mr. 
Irizarry's version reflects Ms. Parker took the money. 
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(2) Regarding the November communication, Mr. Irizarry 
testified: 
Q. Did you have any communication with her after you 
sent the letter and the money in November? 
A. Follow up call to see if the money got there. 
Q. And what do you remember about that call? 
A. Again, she was upset and she said she wouldn't want 
anything to do with me in November after I said -- sent 
money for the second time. 
Q. When you sent the money in November, did you 
understand that she was going to accept it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had you talked about her accepting it in the early 
November phone calls? 
A. No, I don't recall. 
Q. But you believe she would accept it in November? 
A. She did accept it because I never got it back. She 
never sent it back. R.568-569. 
There is nothing in this testimony that indicates that Ms. Parker 
said she did not want Mr. Irizarry's financial support. As in the 
September 1984 communication the evidence is to the contrary 
because Ms. Parker accepted the money that Mr. Irizarry testified 
he sent. 
(3) Regarding the January communication, Mr. Irizarry 
testified: 
Q. Did you have any conversation with her in January of 
1985? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And what was that conversation? Was it a phone call 
or was it a letter? 
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A. I called her in January. After Christmas you think 
about things and I said, "Well, Christmas time, let me 
humble myself again and just call her to see what is up. 
See how she is doing." 
Q. And I take it you did talk to her? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And tell us what you said and what she said in that 
phone call. 
A. She told me that under no circumstances she would 
name them "Irizarry." She wouldn't use "Irizarry" on the 
birth certificates and that she wasn't going to name them 
that. She would name them "Breanna and Brittany Parker." 
Q. Had she had the Breanna and Brittany names picked out 
yet? 
A. Pretty sure. I am pretty sure. It is my 
recollection that, yes, that is what I recall. 
Q. Did she say anything else? 
A. I asked her why because I was serious. What have I 
done to you for you to react in such a way. So I asked 
her why. 
Q. And what did she say? 
A. Same old line: "I just don't want anything." 
Q. What was that? 
A. "I don't want to have to do anything with you 
anymore." R.570-572. 
Again, there is nothing in this testimony that indicates that Ms. 
Parker said that she did not want Mr. Irizarry's financial support. 
Appellee would like the Court to "read between the lines" and 
extrapolate as to what Ms. Parker meant by Mr. Irizarry's "version" 
of the communications in each of these three months; however, this 
would be clearly improper in light of Ms. Parker's direct testimony 
that she never told Mr. Irizarry she did not want him to pay 
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support. R.460. Furthermore, Ms. Parker's testimony is bolstered 
by Mr. Irizarry's admission that she accepted money on the two 
occasions he sent it. R.566, 569. Appellants submit that at best 
Mr. Irizarry's testimony only reflects the anger and frustration of 
Ms. Parker concerning their relationship; however, it is not 
inconsistent with Ms. Parker's testimony that she never told Mr. 
Irizarry that she did not want his support. 
Finally, appellee's "facts" regarding the brevity of the 
relationship between Ms. Parker and Mr. Irizarry are irrelevant. 
Appellee's brief at 7. There is no issue of paternity in this case 
R. 105-106, thus appellants fail to see the relevance of these 
factual details. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A response is needed to appellee's statement of the case, 
wherein appellee gives a "history" concerning the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment in this matter. This "history" is 
bolstered by the "personal knowledge" of Ms. Elisabeth Blattner, 
counsel for the appellee. Appellee's brief at 2; 6. 
First, it would be safe to say that it is without legal 
precedent m d none is cited by appellee to allow a party to 
supplement a record in this way. Secondly, the supposed necessity 
for this "history" is to allow the Court to consider the State's 
third point, which is that 
the facts as found do not constitute equitable estoppel 
as a defense to Mr. Irizarry's pre-filing support 
obligation to his biological children. 
Appellee's brief at 2, Appellants' brief at 43. 
6 
This alleged history is not needed for any consideration of 
the appellants' point on this issue. Appellants' argument is that 
even if the findings made by the lower court are totally accepted 
as not being clearly erroneous, they do not support a determination 
that estoppel is an appropriate defense in this case. Appellants 
are not arguing that the lower court did not say enough in the 
findings; appellants are arguing that what the lower court said 
does not support a determination of estoppel. Thus, the fact that 
appellee wanted the lower court to say more and is willing to 
supplement the record with unsworn allegations of counsel to 
support additional findings is not only highly inappropriate but 
totally irrelevant to the Court's consideration of appellants' 
point on this issue. 
Appellee's distorted version of the "facts" and his 
unsubstantiated additions to the statement of the case are intended 
to divert the Court's focus from the three determinations the State 
seeks in this case: 
(1) that the unique nature of paternity and child support 
establishment cases does not give rise to circumstances 
where equitable estoppel and laches are appropriate as 
defenses to a biological father's support obligation; or 
(2) even if the principles of equitable estoppel may be 
applied in a paternity or child support case, the lower 
court's finding in this case on the necessary element of 
representation made by Ms. Parker are clearly erroneous; 
or 
(3) even if the lower court's finding on the 
representation element of equitable estoppel is not 
clearly erroneous, the facts found do not support a 
finding of equitable estoppel as a defense to Mr. 
Irizarry's prefiling support obligation to his biological 
children. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT CAN DETERMINE THAT EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS NOT 
AVAILABLE AS A DEFENSE TO A BIOLOGICAL FATHER'S SUPPORT 
OBLIGATION. 
The appellee contends that since appellants did not raise this 
issue at the lower court level appellants should not be allowed to 
argue that the unpublished precursor decision to Burrow v. 
Vrontikis, 788 P. 2d 1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) should not be used as 
precedent in this case. Clearly, at the lower court level, 
appellants could not make a good faith argument to the district 
court that the defense of estoppel is not available because the 
published Vrontikis decision, Vrontikis II, implies that the 
defense is available. Unlike the lower court, this Court can 
overrule this aspect of Vrontikis II because it is clearly 
erroneous. State v. Menzies, No. 880161, slip op. at 6 n. 3 (Utah 
March 29, 1994) . This Court also can choose not to consider 
Vrontikis II of precedential authority based upon the fact that its 
reasoning is set forth in an unpublished decision, Vrontikis I. 
State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1991); Paffel v. Paffel, 
732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986). 
It is also the appellants' position that the Utah Supreme 
Court case of Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987) is 
distinguishable and thus is not determinative of the issue before 
this Court. Borland was a paternity action, but, the issue was 
whether laches should be a bar to prosecution of the paternit^ 
action brought against the father. Id. at 144. While the Court 
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did hold that generally equitable defenses could be applied to 
actions at law, it did not specifically consider whether equitable 
estoppel can ever be asserted by a biological father to defeat his 
obligation to support his child. Id. at 146. One distinction that 
the Borland Court would have had to resolve if it had considered 
the issue of equitable estoppel in a case of this type is whether 
equitable estoppel should be a complete bar as this defense is 
generally considered, Mendez v. State, 813 P. 2d 1234 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), or under what circumstances in a paternity action it could 
be a partial bar.4 
As an alternative to Borland as support for his position, 
appellee has cited Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974) and 
Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 (Utah 1976) . However, neither 
Baggs nor Wasescha was a paternity case where the State is a party. 
Neither Baggs nor Wasescha is determinative of the issue before 
this Court. There is a clear distinction to be made in a paternity 
action brought under the Uniform Paternity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
78-45a(l) et seq. where the State is a party. Appellee may not 
like nor appreciate the distinction, but it is significant.5 
4This is distinguishable from laches under Borland because the 
circumstances were such that laches would have completely barred 
the prosecution of that paternity action. Id. at 146. 
5For purposes of clarity to the court, the State has used the 
term appellants without making any distinction between the State of 
Utah, by and through Department of Social Services and ex rel. 
Cathy Parker, however, this is for ease of reading by the court and 
should by no means be interpreted to indicate that the State is 
waiving the arguments outlined in its brief. Appellants' brief at 
31-34. 
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An "ex rel." action is an action that is brought in the name 
of the State but on information and at the instigation of a private 
individual with a private interest in the outcome. See Black's Law 
Dictionary (5th ed. 1983). Clearly Ms. Parker, as the custodial 
parent of the twins, has a private interest in the outcome; 
however, the State, with its responsibilities under federal and 
state law to the children has a separate and distinct role in this 
matter. Appellants' brief at 31-34. 
This Court can and should make a determination that in 
paternity actions, where the Uniform Act on Paternity provides that 
the father's liability for education expenses and necessary support 
are limited to a period of four years next preceding the 
commencement of an action, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-3 (1992), the 
legislature has statutorily considered when a biological father has 
an appropriate defense to a custodial mother's failure to pursue 
child support. 
In analysis, the ultimate statement that child support is not 
wanted is made by not filing a paternity action. This would seem 
to indicate that the legislature intended § 78-45a-3 to be an anti-
estoppel provision to preclude estoppel as a defense to an action 
under the Uniform Act on Paternity, including claim for child 
support during that four year period before the action was filed. 
POINT II 
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT ARE NOT SUPPORTABLE BY 
THE EVIDENCE AND THUS ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The lower court in its ruling from the bench felt that, 
regarding the representation element of equitable estoppel, the 
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critical factual issue was whether or not Ms. Parker made 
statements claimed by Mr. Irizarry in three phone calls. R.627-
628. The lower court acknowledged that Ms. Parker denied making 
any statements to Mr. Irizarry suggesting that she did not want 
support from him for the children. R.627-628. 
The three phone calls referred to by the lower court in its 
ruling were in the months of September 1984, November 1984 and 
January 1985, all prior to the birth of the twins. R.566, 567, 
570. Ms. Parker testified that she called Mr. Irizarry in November 
1984 to tell him she was expecting twins. R.452. Ms. Parker 
accepted the money that Mr. Irizarry sent her in November 1984. 
R.56 9. This evidence was not addressed in the lower court's 
findings. 
Additionally, after the January 1985 phone call, Mr. Irizarry 
testified that he still thought he had a financial obligation to 
the children. R.572. Thus, at worst, Ms. Parker's statements are 
truthful that she did not ever say she did not want financial 
support for the twins. If Ms. Parker did make statements to the 
contrary, Mr. Irizarry did not believe and rely upon those 
statements. 
Furthermore, the lower court findings ignore contacts Ms. 
Parker testified she made after the children were born. 
1. In June 1985, she called Mr. Irizarry to tell him 
that the children were born. She left the message with 
a female roommate asking Mr. Irizarry to call her R.454, 
11 
573.6 
2. In July 1985, Ms. Parker testified that she contacted 
Mr. Irizarry at his father's home and they discussed the 
twins and set up a meeting time for October 1985 to see 
the twins. R.455. Mr. Irizarry denied any memory of 
this phone call. R.574-576. 
3. In October 1985, Ms. Parker arrived to meet Mr. 
Irizarry. The meeting never occurred but Ms. Parker did 
take the children to the home of Andre Irizarry, (their 
grandfather) to meet him. R.456. Mr. Irizarry testified 
that he became aware of this meeting in February 1986 
while living in Puerto Rico. R.456. 
4. In October 1985, Ms. Parker went to Mr. Irizarry7s 
father's home [looking for Mr. Irizarry]. R.456. 
5. In February 1987, Ms. Parker hired a private 
investigator to find Mr. Irizarry. R.458-459, 473. 
All of the above was ignored by the lower court in its 
findings and determination of estoppel in this case. This omission 
resulted in a finding that was clearly erroneous by the lower 
court. 
POINT III 
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT DO NOT SUPPORT A DEFENSE 
OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IN THIS CASE. 
All of the alleged contacts and statements relied upon by the 
lower court were contacts and statements made before the birth of 
the children and before any support accrued. None of the cases 
cited by appellee - Vrontikis, Borland, Baggs, and Wasescha - stand 
for the proposition that representations made in connection with an 
estoppel defense can be representations made prior to the birth of 
6Appellee is contesting the testimony wherein Ms. Parker left 
a message asking Mr. Irizarry to call her. This is actually 
irrelevant whether Ms. Parker left the message asking Mr. Irizarry 
to call since the crucial fact is that Ms. Parker made contact or 
attempted to make contact with Mr. Irizarry. 
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the child or children. This Court can take judicial notice that 
there is no child support obligation until a child is born. 
Obviously, until the child or children are born, no obligation can 
arise because there is a chance that the child or children will not 
be born. Additionally, no expenses such as those for birthing, 
food, clothing, or shelter are incurred on behalf of the child 
until the child is born. This is a simple but very important 
point. 
Regarding the reliance element of estoppel, there are no 
statements of injury and/or reliance that support an estoppel 
defense. The lower court found: 
...that Plaintiff [Ms. Parker] made statements, took 
actions that led the Defendant [Mr. Irizarry] to 
reasonably conclude that she wanted nothing to do with 
him and didn't want his support. In reliance upon that, 
the Defendant got on with his life, got married, and 
started a family and under those circumstances should not 
be responsible for the payment of child support until May 
30, 1989, when this complaint was filed... 
R.630. 
There is no nexus between Mr. Irizarry marrying his current 
wife and having a family and the alleged statements of Ms. Parker 
indicating that she did not want him in her life. In other words, 
there was no finding that, but for the alleged statements of Ms. 
Parker, Mr. Irizarry would not have gotten married and had a 
family. In Larsen v. Larsen, 300 P.2d 596 (Utah 1956), the Court, 
talking about reliance, stated, 
Where the father's failure to make such payments was 
induced by her representations or actions, and where as 
a result of such representations or actions, the father 
has been lulled into failing to make such payments and 
then to changing his position which he would not have 
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done but for such representations, and that as a result 
of such failure to pay and change in his conditions it 
will cause him great hardship and injustice if she is 
allowed to enforce the payment of such back installments, 
she may be thereby estopped from enforcing the payment of 
such back installments. 
Id. at 598. 
In this case, Mr. Irizarry started dating his current wife six 
months before his and Ms. Parker's children were born. He began 
seriously dating her and talked about marriage one to two months 
before the two children were born. His current wife was pregnant 
with their first child approximately three months after his and Ms. 
Parker's children were born, and he was married to his current wife 
approximately six months after the children were born. R.593-594. 
Furthermore, after the last of the three phone calls, the lower 
court relied upon for its finding of reliance, R.627-628, Mr. 
Irizarry felt he still had a financial obligation to the children. 
R.572. Based upon this evidence, there could be no finding by the 
lower court that Mr. Irizarry would not have married and started a 
family with his current wife had he known that he had a child 
support obligation. 
The injury alleged by appellee is injury based upon the fact 
that he would owe back due child support if he was ordered to pay 
it. Appellants submit that this type of injury is present in every 
case of this kind. There is nothing special about the type of 
injury asserted by Mr. Irizarry. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should rule that 
estoppel should not have barred the trial court from making a 
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determination that Mr. Irizarry owes a child support obligation for 
the pre-filing period of May 30, 1985, through May 30, 1989. In 
this regard, the case should be remanded to the lower court for an 
entry of an amended judgment against Mr. Irizarry for an 
appropriate amount of child support for that time period. 
Respectfully submitted this / day of April, 1994. 
LINDA LUINBTRA 
BILLY L. WALKER 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
Attorneys for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered two copies of 
the foregoing Appellants' Reply Brief to the attorney for Appellee, 
Elisabeth R. Blattner, PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER, 201 South Main, 
#1800, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110. 
DATED this I day of April, 1994. 
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ADDENDUM 
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UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 78-45a-l 
78-45-13. Interpretation and construction. 
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 14. 
Meaning of "this act." — See note under 
same catchline following § 78-45-1. 
Cross-References. — Construction of stat-
utes, Chapter 3 of Title 68. 
CHAPTER 45a 
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 
Section 
78-45a-l. 
78-45a-2. 
78-45a-3. 
78-45a-4. 
78-45a-5. 
78-45a-6. 
78-45a-6.5. 
78-45a-7. 
78-45a-8. 
78-45a-L 
Obligations of the father. 
Enforcement. 
Limitation on recovery from the 
father. 
Limitations on recovery from 
father's estate. 
Remedies. 
Time of trial. 
Paternity action — Jury trial. 
Authonty for blood tests. 
Selection of experts. 
Section 
78-45a-9. 
78-45a-10. 
78-45a-ll. 
78-45a-12. 
78-45a-13. 
78-45a-14. 
78-45a-15. 
78-45a-16. 
78-45a-17. 
Obligations of the father. 
Compensation of expert wi 
nesses. 
Effect of test results. 
Judgment. 
Security. 
Settlement agreements. 
Venue. 
Uniformity of interpretation. 
Short title. 
Operation of act. 
The father of a child that is or may be born outside of marriage is liable to 
the same extent as the father of a child born within marriage, whether or not 
the child is born alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy 
and confinement and for the education, necessary support, and any funeral 
expenses for the child. For purposes of child support collection, a child born 
outside of marriage includes a child born to a married woman by a man other 
than her husband if that paternity has been established. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 1; 1990, ch. 
245, § 22. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted 
"outside of marriage" for "out of wedlock" in 
both sentences and "within marriage" for "in 
wedlock" in the first sentence, added "For pur-
poses of child support collection" and the clause 
beginning "if at the end in the second sen-
tence, and made stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Public support of chil-
dren, §§ 62A-11-301 to 62A-11-332. 
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, 
§ 78-45-1 et seq. 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action for reimbursement. 
—Collateral estoppel. 
—Costs. 
Action to establish paternity. 
"^Attorney fees. 
—Statute of limitations. 
Tolling. 
Cause of action for support. 
Custody rights. 
— Acknowledgment of paternity. 
Right to trial by jury. 
Action for reimbursement. 
—Collateral estoppel. 
Where, in a paternity action brought for re-
imbursement of money provided for the benefit 
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of a child allegedly fathered by defendant, the 
district court found that the state was barre" 
from asserting its claim by the doctrine of re*8 
against the child's mother for failure to answ^r 
interrogatories, it was held that since the d#" 
fendant's cause of action against the moth^r 
was different from that of the state under tl*e 
Uniform Act on Paternity, the issue involved 
collateral estoppel, and because none of tl*e 
tests to apply collateral estoppel had been me^ 
res judicata had no application to the case-
State ex rel. State Dep't of Social Servs. v-
Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)-
—Costs. 
The Uniform Act on Paternity makes no pr°" 
vision for an award of costs against the state in 
an action for reimbursement. State ex re-
state Dep't of Social Servs. v. Ruscetta, 7^2 
P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Action to establish paternity. 
—Attorney fees. 
This act makes no provision for awarding at-
torney fees to the mother in an action to esta^" 
lish paternity. Zito v. Butler, 584 P.2d 8#8 
(Utah 1978), overruled on grounds, Borland v-
Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987). 
—Statute of limitations. 
Tolling. 
Any statute limiting the time within which a 
paternity action must be commenced under the 
Uniform Act on Paternity is tolled for all statu* 
torily qualified plaintiffs during the period of 
the child's minority. Szarak v. Sandoval 636 
P.2d 1082 (Utah 1981). 
Cause of action for support. 
A minor child, via her guardian ad litem, 
has standing to maintain a cause of action 
against her father for support. Fauver v 
Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
Custody rights. 
—Acknowledgment of paternity. 
Father who publicly acknowledged his pater-
nity had right to custody of his illegitimate 
child, second only to mother's right, so that it 
was improper for juvenile court to dismiss peti-
tion for custody and thereby terminate father's 
parental right without hearing to determine 
whether he was fit and proper person. State ex 
rel. Baby Girl M, 25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P.2d 
1013, 45 A.L.R.3d 206 (1970). 
Under § 78-45-4.1, a stepparent has the obli-
gation of support to the same extent as a natu-
ral parent so long as the stepparent's marriage 
to the natural parent continues. State ex rel. 
J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990). 
Right to trial by jury. 
Since there is no inherent constitutional 
right to a trial by jury in paternity proceeding! 
\^ ^  j^*2\fc *ssA Mwfe Vi&g&ta&sra Vras* -W&, ^ ssv 
vided for such a right by statute, the defen» 
dant, a putative father, had no right to a trill 
by jury. Hyatt v. Hill, 714 P.2d 299 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Nordgren v. MitcheH-
Indigent Paternity Defendants' Right to CoUn" 
sel, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 933. 
Comment, Husband Notification for Ab0r" 
tion in Utah: A Patronizing Problem, 19^6 
Utah L. Rev. 609. 
Note, Establishing Paternity Through HJ>^  
Testing: Utah Standards for Admissibility* 
1988 Utah L. Rev. 717. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Ju^1" 
cial Decisions — Civil Procedure, 1989 Utah k. 
Rev. 166. 
From Guesswork to Guidelines—The Ad0P" 
tion of Uniform Child Support Guidelines i n 
Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 859. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — No^e' 
J.W.F. v. Schoolcraft: The Husband's Rights t 0 
His Wife's Illegitimate Child Under Utah Law> 
lS89B;iA3. L. Hev. 955. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastard* 
§ 68. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 18. 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of puta-
tive father's promise to support or provide ftr 
illegitimate child, 20 A.L.R.3d 500. 
Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 5H 
A.L.R.4th 565.
 m ^ 
Rights and obligations resulting frwjl 
human artificial insemination, 83 A.L.R.4tti 
295. 
Admissibility or compellability of blood \ 
to establish testees nonpaternity for purpoitl 
challenging testee's parental rights, 
A.L.R.4th 572. 
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children 
21. 
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78-45a-2. Enforcement. 
Paternity may be determined upon the petition of the mother, child, puta-
tive father, or the public authority chargeable by law with the support of the 
child. If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to 
the laws of this state, the liabilities of the father may be enforced in the same 
or other proceedings: 
(1) by the mother, child, or the public authority that has furnished or 
may furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, educa-
tion, necessary support, or funeral expenses; and 
(2) by other persons including private agencies to the extent that they 
have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, edu-
cation, necessary support, or funeral expenses. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 2; 1990, ch. 
245, § 23. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted "puta-
tive father" in the first sentence and made 
minor stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Enforcement of provi-
ANALYSIS 
Estoppel and laches. 
Evidence. 
—Conception and birth. 
Right to counsel. 
—Indigent prisoners. 
Blood tests. 
Discretion of court. 
Standard of proof. 
—Preponderance of evidence. 
Estoppel and laches. 
Under appropriate circumstances, laches 
may bar an action for paternity. Borland v. 
Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987). 
A paternity action brought six years after 
the birth of the child was not barred by laches, 
where defendant made no factual showing to 
support his argument that he was prejudiced 
by the delay. Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 
144 (Utah 1987). 
Evidence. 
—Conception and birth. 
Where child was conceived while mother was 
_married to her first husband and born while 
she was married to her second husband, the 
child was legitimate whichever husband was 
the father, and testimony by mother that dis-
puted second husband's fatherhood and sup-
ported first husband's fatherhood would not 
illegitimize the child and was properly admis-
sible in paternity action against first husband. 
Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982). 
sions by Department of Human Services, 
§ 62A-1-111. 
Office of Recovery Services to perform duties 
of Department of Human Services in collecting 
child support, § 62A-11-104. 
Public support of children, §§ 62A-11-301 to 
62A-11-332. 
Right to counsel. 
—Indigent prisoners. 
Blood tests. 
While due process does not require Utah to 
appoint counsel for all indigent prisoners who 
are defendants in paternity cases, there may be 
some complicated paternity suits in which the 
risks of error would be high enough that the 
presumption against the right to appointed 
counsel would be overcome; given the avail-
ability and quality of the blood tests, there is 
no need for appointment of counsel prior to the 
time the tests are given. Nordgren v. Mitchell, 
716 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1983). 
Discretion of court. 
Due process of law does not require tha t all 
indigent, incarcerated defendants in paternity 
actions must always be appointed counsel; 
whether due process requires the appointment 
of counsel in such cases is vested in the discre-
tion of the trial court. Nordgren v. Mitchell, 
524 F. Supp. 242 (D. Utah 1981), affd, 716 F.2d 
1335 (10th Cir. 1983). 
Standard of proof. 
—Preponderance of evidence. 
The applicable standard of proof where pa-
ternity is asserted is "by a preponderance of 
the evidence." Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 
(Utah 1982). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Establishing 
Paternity Through HLA Testing: Utah Stan-
dards for Admissibility, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 717. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note, 
Wiese v. Wiese: Support Obligations of Step-
parents—The Utah Supreme Court Toppled by 
Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 305 (1987). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards 
§ 74 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 32 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Death of putative father as pre-
cluding action for determination of paternity 
or for child support, 58 A.L.R.3d 188. 
Statute of limitations in illegitimacy or bas-
tardy proceedings, 59 A.L.R.3d 685. 
Necessity or propriety of appointment of in-
dependent guardian for child who is subject of 
paternity proceedings, 70 A.L.R.4th 1033. 
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=» 
30 et seq. 
78-45a-3. Limitation on recovery from the father. 
The father's liability for past education and necessary support are limited to 
a period of four years next preceding the commencement of an action. 
History* L. 1965, ch. 158, § 3. for support or maintenance of dependent chil-
Cross-References. — Limitation of action dren, § 78-12-22. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Statute of limitations. 
—Tolling. 
While any statute limiting the time within 
which a paternity action must be commenced 
under the Uniform Act on Paternity is tolled 
for all statutorily qualified plaintiffs during 
the child's minority, the amount of recovery of 
child support is still limited by this section. 
Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 
1981). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note, 
Clark v. Jeter. Equal Protection Versus Stat-
utes of Limitation in Paternity Actions, 15 J. 
Contemp. L. 119 (1989). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards 
§ 127. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53. 
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children <s=» 
35. 
78-45a-4. Limitations on recovery from father's estate. 
The obligation of the estate of the father for liabilities under this act are 
limited to amounts accrued prior to his death and such sums as may be pay-
able for dependency under other laws. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 4. Cross-References. — Civil liability for sup-
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this port, Chapter 45 of this title. 
act," as used in this section, means Laws 1965, 
ch. 158, which enacted §§ 78-45a-l to 
78-45a-17. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=» 
§ 127. 35 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53. 
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78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Cummings v. Cummings, 175 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 23 (Ct. App. 1991). 
78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Watson v Watson, 194 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 42 (Ct. App. 1992). 
CHAPTER 45a 
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 
Section Section 
78-45a-5. Remedies. 78-45a-10. Effect of genetic test results 
78-45a-7 Authontv for genetic testing. 
78-45a-5. Remedies. 
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action to establish paternity. All 
remedies for enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and confine-
ment for a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses for 
legitimate children shall apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to mod-
ify or revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All 
remedies under Title 77, Chapter 31, Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act, are available for enforcement of duties of support under this act. 
(2) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and the 
Department of Human Services may proceed on behalf of the obligee or in its 
own behalf, pursuant to the provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11, to enforce 
that right of support against the obligor. In such actions by the department, 
the provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11, shall apply. Whenever the depart-
ment commences an action under this act, it shall be the duty of the attorney 
general or the county attorney of the county where the obligee resides to 
represent the department. 
(3) The court may enter an order awarding costs, attorney fees, and witness 
fees in the manner prescribed by Section 30-3-3 upon a judgment or acknowl-
edgment of paternity. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, * 5; 1975, ch. 96, 
$ 24; 1990, ch. 183, $ 60; 1992, ch. 160, $ 2; 
1993, ch. 137, $ 16. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1992, in Subsection (1). 
divided the former first sentence into two sen-
tences, substituted "action to establish pater-
nity" for "action under this act at the end of 
the present first sentence, and added the title 
and chapter citation to the reference in the last 
sentence; in Subsection (2), substituted the ref-
erence to Title 62A, Chapter 11 for "Chapter 
45b of this title"in the first and second sen-
tences; designated the former last sentence of 
Subsection (2) as Subsection (3) and substi-
tuted "the department commences an action 
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, . under this act" for "a court action is com- The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, 
CI 111- menced by the state Department of Human deleted the (3) designation formerly before the 
Services'in that subsection: and made stylistic present last sentence in Subsection (2) and 
changes throughout the section. added present Subsection (3). 
78-45a-6. Time of trial. 
If the issue of paternity is raised in action commenced during the pregnancy 
of the mother, the trial shall not, without the consent of the alleged father, be 
held until after the birth or miscarriage but during such delay testimony may 
be perpetuated according to the laws of this state. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 6. 
Cross-References. — Depositions before ac-
tion, Rule 27, U.R.C.P 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children <s=> 
* 123. 55. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 101. 
78-45a-6.5. Paternity action — Jury trial. 
(1) Either party to an action commenced under this chapter may demand a 
jury trial to determine paternity. 
(2) (a) The procedure and law governing a trial by jury under this chapter 
is the same as for a civil jury trial in district court. 
(b) The standard of proof is "by a preponderance of the evidence." 
History: C. 1953, 78-45a-6.5, enacted by L. came effective on April 25, 1988. pursuant to 
1988, ch. 93, § 1. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 93 be-
78-45a-7. Authority for genetic testing, 
(1) Upon motion of any party to the action, made at a time so as not to delay 
the proceedings unduly, the court shall order the mother, the child, and the 
alleged father to submit to genetic testing. 
(2) The court may, upon its own initiative or upon request made by or on 
behalf of any person whose blood is involved, order the mother, the child, and 
the alleged father to submit to genetic testing. 
(3) If any party refuses to submit to those tests, the court may resolve the 
question of paternity against that party, or may enforce its order if the rights 
of others and the interests of justice so require. 
ififffT^ L ' ^ ^ C h ' 1 5 8 ' * ? ; 1 9 9 2 ' C h ' t e n C e m t ° t W° s e n t e n<*s, reversing their order 
160, $ 3.
 a n d substituting "genetic testing" for "blood 
Amendment iNotes. - The 1992 amend- tests" m both subsections and "request" for 
ment effective July 1, 1992, added the subsec- "suggestion" in Subsection (2); and made stv-
twn designations; divided the former first sen- listic changes throughout the section. 
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A.L.R. — Admissibility or compellability of Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children «=» 
blood test to establish testee's nonpaternity for 45. 
purpose of challenging testees parental rights, 
87 A.L.R.4th 572. 
78-45a-8. Selection of experts. 
The tests shall be made by experts qualified as examiners of blood types 
who shall be appointed by the court. The experts shall be called by the court 
as witnesses to testify to their findings and shall be subject to cross-examina-
tion by the parties. Any party or person at whose suggestion the tests have 
been ordered may demand that other experts, qualified as examiners of blood 
types, perform independent tests under order of court, the results of which 
may be offered in evidence. The number and qualifications of such experts 
shall be determined by the court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 8. Court appointment of expert witnesses. Rule 
Cross-References. — Blood test examiner 706, U.R.E. 
as witness, § 78-25-20. 
78-45a-9. Compensation of expert witnesses. 
The compensation of each expert witness appointed by the court shall be 
fixed at a reasonable amount. It shall be paid as the court shall order. The 
court may order that it be paid by the parties in such proportions and at such 
times as it shall prescribe. The fee of an expert witness called by a party but 
not appointed by the court shall be paid by the party calling him but shall not 
be taxed as costs in the action. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 9. 
Cross-References. — Judgment and costs, 
Rule 54, U.R.C.P. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 138. 
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «= 
75. 
(1) If the court finds that the conclusions of all experts, as disclosed by the 
evidence based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the father of 
the child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly. 
(2) If the experts conclude that the genetic tests show the possibility of the 
alleged fathers paternity, admission of that evidence is within the discretion 
of the court. 
(3) (a/ A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if genetic 
testing results in a paternity index of at least 100. 
(b) A presumption under this subsection may be rebutted in an appro-
priate action only by clear and convincing evidence. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), the court may receive testi-
mony and genetic test results from genetic testing experts and others 
involved in conducting the genetic tests in the form of an affidavit. 
(b) If any party objects to the court's receipt of the testimony or test 
results in affidavit form, that party may file a written objection with the 
court. The objection shall be filed within 30 days after service of the 
written test results on that party. Failure to timely file an objection under 
this subsection constitutes a waiver of that objection. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 10; 1992, ch. agree in their findings or conclusions, the ques-
160, § 4. tion shall be submitted upon all the evidence"; 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- substituted "genetic tests" for 'blood tests." de-
ment, effective July 1, 1992. designated the leted "depending upon the infrequency of the 
former first and third sentences as Subsections blood type" from the end. and made a stylistic 
(1) and (2), respectively; deleted the former sec- change in Subsection (2); and added Subsec-
ond sentence which read: "If the experts dis- tions (3) and (4) 
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Judgments under this act may be for periodic payments which may vary in 
amount. The court may order payments to be made to the mother or to some 
person, corporation, or agency designated to administer them under the super-
vision of the court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, §11. Cross-References. — Income withholding, 
Meaning of "this act." — See note under §§ 62A-11-401 to 62A-11-414. 
same catchhne following § 78-45a-4 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=» 
* 127 67 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards * 111. 
78-45a-12. Security, 
The court may require the alleged father to give bond or other security for 
the payment of the judgment. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 12. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=» 
* 128 70 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards *> 118 et seq 
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78-45a-13. Settlement agreements. 
An agreement of settlement with the alleged father is binding only when 
approved by the court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 13. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am Jur 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children «=» 
§ 98 et seq 33 
C.J.S. — 10 C J S Bastards § 40 et seq 
78-45a-14. Venue. 
An action under this act may be brought in the county where the alleged 
father is present or has property or in the county where the mother resides. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 14. Cross-References. — Venue, general provi-
Meaning of "this act" — See note under sions, Chapter 13 of this title 
same catchhne following § 78-45a-4 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am Jur 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children <s=> 
§ 76 37 
C.J.S. — 10 C J S Bastards ^ 57 58 
78-45a-15. Uniformity of interpretation. 
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 15. adopting the Uniform Act on Paternity are 
Meaning of "this act." — As to meaning of Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, New Hamp-
"[t]his act," as used in this section see note shire, and Rhode Island 
under same catchhne following § 78-45a-4 Cross-References. — Construction of stat-
Uniform Laws. — Other jurisdictions utes, Chapter 3 of Title 68 
78-45a-16. Short title. 
This act shall be known and mav be cited as the "Uniform Act on Pater-
nity." 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 16. '[t]his act," as used in this section, see note 
Meaning of "this act." — As to meaning of under same catchhne following § 78-45a-4 
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78-45a-17. Operation of act. 
This act applies to all cases of birth out of wedlock as defined in this act 
where birth occurs after this act takes effect. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 17. 
Meaning of "this act." — As to meaning of 
"[t]his act," appearing throughout this section, 
see note under same catchline following 
§ 78-45a-4. 
The term "after this act takes effect" means 
after the effective date of Laws 1965, ch. 158, 
i.e., May 11, 1965. 
CHAPTER 45b 
PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CHILDREN 
(Repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 10, § 2; 1987, ch. 161, § 314; 1988, ch. 1, § 407.) 
78-45b-l to 78-45b-25. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 407 repeals 
§§ 78-45b-l to 78-45b-6, as enacted by Laws 
1975, ch. 96, § 1, Laws 1977, ch. 145, § 1, and 
Laws 1985. ch. 8, § 2 and as amended by Laws 
1987, ch. 77, § 3 and Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
§§ 309 to 312. relating to common law reme-
dies, definitions, support debt and hearings, ef-
fective January 19, 1988. For present compara-
ble provisions, see §§ 62A-11-301 to 
62A-11-308. 
Laws 1987, ch. 161, § 314 repeals 
§ 78-45b-6.1, as last amended by Laws 1983, 
ch. 161, § 2, concerning findings in order by 
department and judicial review, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1988. 
Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 407 repeals §§ 78-45b-7 
to 78-45b-21, as enacted by Laws 1975, ch. 96, 
§§ 7, 10, 12, 14 to 18, 20 and 21, Laws 1984 
(S.S.), ch. 2, § 1 and Laws 1985, ch. 9, § 1 and 
as amended by Laws 1977, ch. 145, § 8, Laws 
1984, ch. 14, § 1, Laws 1984 (S.S.), ch. 2, § 2, 
Laws 1985, ch. 10, § 1 and Laws 1987, ch. 151, 
§ 313, relating to liens, final orders, payments 
and charging all uncollectable support debts, 
effective January 19, 1988. For present compa-
rable provisions, see §§ 62A-11-309 to 
62A-11-321. 
Section 78-45b-22 (L. 1975, ch. 96, § 22), re-
lating to inapplicability of statute of limita-
tions to liens, wage assignment or garnish-
ment, was repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 10, § 2. 
Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 407 repeals §§ 78-45b-23 
to 78-45b-25, as enacted by Laws 1984, ch. 13, 
§ 5, Laws 1985, ch. 13, § 1 and Laws 1987, ch. 
77, § 4, relating to medical and dental ex-
penses of dependent children, providing court 
debt information to consumer reporting agen-
cies, and the information received from state 
tax commissioner, effective January 19, 1988. 
For present comparable provisions, see 
§§ 62A-11-326 to 62A-11-328. 
CHAPTER 45c 
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY 
JURISDICTION 
Section 
78-45c-l. 
78-45c-2. 
78-45c-3. 
78-45c-4. 
Purposes — Construction. 
Definitions. 
Bases of jurisdiction in 
state. 
Persons to be notified 
heard. 
this 
and 
Section 
78-45c-5. 
78-45c-6. 
Service of notice outside state 
— Proof of service — Submis-
sion to jurisdiction. 
Proceedings pending elsewhere 
— Jurisdiction not exercised 
— Inquiry to other state — 
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EXPRESS 300 
knowledge of intended use and affirmative and 
active consent thereto. 
Express private trust See Trust 
Express repeal. Abrogation or annulment of pre-
viously existing law by enactment of subse-
quent statute declaring that former law shall be 
revoked or abrogated. 
Express republication. Occurs with respect to 
will when testator repeats ceremonies essential 
to valid execution, with avowed intention of 
republishing will. 
Express terms. Within provision that qualified 
acceptance, in "express terms," vanes effect of 
draft, "express terms" means clear, unambigu-
ous, definite, certain, and unequivocal terms. 
Express trust See Trust 
Express warranty. See Warranty. 
Expropriation. A taking, as under eminent do-
main. This term is also used in the context of a 
foreign government taking an American indus-
try located in the foreign country. In Louisi-
ana, the word has the same general meaning as 
eminent domain. 
A voluntary surrender of rights or claims; 
the act of divesting oneself of that which was 
previously claimed as one's own, or renouncing 
it. In this sense it is the opposite of "appropri-
ation.'f 
See also Condemnation; Eminent domain. 
Expulsion. A putting or driving out. Ejectment; 
banishment; a cutting off from the privileges of 
an institution or society permanently. The act 
of depriving a member of a corporation, legisla-
tive body, assembly, society, commercial or-
ganization, etc., of his membership in the same, 
by a legal vote of the body itself, for breach of 
duty, improper conduct, or other sufficient 
cause. Also, in the law of torts and of landlord 
and tenant, an eviction or forcible putting out. 
See Deportation; Ejectment; Eviction; Expel; 
Forcible entry and detainer; Summary (Sum-
mary process). 
Expunge. To destroy; blot out; obliterate; 
erase; efface designedly; strike out wholly. 
The act of physically destroying information— 
including criminal records—in files, computers, 
or other depositories. 
Expungement of record. Process by which rec-
ord of criminal conviction is destroyed or 
sealed after expiration of time. See also Era-
sure (Erasure of record). 
Expurgation. The act of purging or cleansing, as 
where a book is published without its obscene 
passages. 
Expurgator. One who corrects by expurging. 
Ex quasi contractu /eks kweysay kantraekchuw/. 
From quasi contract. 
Ex rei. See Ex relatione. 
I Ex relatione /eks releyshiyowniy/. Upon rela-
I tion or information. 
Legal proceedings which are instituted by the 
attorney general (or other proper person) in the 
name and behalf of the state, but on the infor-
mation and at the instigation of an individual 
I who has a private interest in the matter, are 
said to be taken "on the relation" (ex relatione) 
of such person, who is called the "relator." 
Such a cause is usually entitled thus: "State ex 
rei Doe v. Roe." 
In the books of reports, when a case is said 
to be reported ex relatione, it is meant that the 
reporter derives his account of it, not from 
personal knowledge, but from the relation or 
| narrative of some person who was present at 
I the argument. 
I Ex rights. Literally, without rights. Stock sold 
ex rights is sold without privileged subscription 
rights to a current new issue by a corporation. 
| Ex tempore /eks tempariy/. From or in conse-
quence of time; by lapse of time. Ex diuturno 
tempore, from length of time. Without prepa-
ration or premeditation. 
Extend. Term lends itself to great variety of 
meanings, which must in each case be gathered 
from context. It may mean to expand, enlarge, 
prolong, lengthen, widen, carry or draw out 
further than the original limit; e.g., to extend 
the time for filing an answer, to extend a lease, 
term of office, charter, railroad track. See also 
Extension; Renewal. 
Extended. A lengthening out of time previously 
fixed and not the arbitrary setting of a new 
date. Stretched, spread, or drawn out. 
j Extended coverage clause. Provision in insur-
ance policy which carries protection for haz-
I ards beyond those covered in the basic policy. 
See also Omnibus clause. 
i Extended insurance. An option to use dividend 
to procure extended insurance is one to pro-
cure extension of term of insurance from date 
to which premiums have been paid, without 
further payment. 
I Extension. An increase in length of time (e.g. of 
i expiration date of lease, or due date of note). 
Bankruptcy. An extension proposal is an 
agreement on part of creditors that they will 
, extend time within which their claims are prob-
I ably to be paid, in full as to secured creditors, | on terms proposed by debtor and approved by 
; court. 
I Commercial law. An allowance of additional 
time for the payment of debts. An agreement 
I between a debtor and his creditors, by which 
] they allow him further time for the payment of 
| his liabilities. A creditor's indulgence by giving 
a debtor further time to pay an existing debt. 
J Lease. The word when used in its proper and 
I usual sense in connection with a lease, means a 
prolongation of the previous leasehold estate. 
s \ 
